We investigate the impact of coalition formation on the efficiency of Cournot games where producers face uncertainties. In particular, we study a market model where firms must determine their output before an uncertain production capacity is realized. In contrast to standard Cournot models, we show that the game is not efficient when there are many small firms. Instead, producers tend to act conservatively to hedge against their risks. We show that in the presence of uncertainty, the game becomes efficient when firms are allowed to take advantage of diversity to form groups of certain sizes. We characterize the tradeoff between market power and uncertainty reduction as a function of group size. In particular, we compare the welfare and output obtained with coalitional competition, with the same benchmarks when output is controlled by a single system operator. We show that when there are N firms present, competition between groups of size Ω( √ N ) results in equilibria that are socially optimal in terms of welfare and groups of size Ω(N 2 /3 ) are socially optimal in terms of production. We also extend our results to the case of uncertain demand by establishing an equivalency between the Cournot oligopoly and Cournot Oligopsony. We demonstrate our results with real data from electricity markets with significant wind power penetration.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OURNOT games are among the most extensively studied models for oligopolistic competition among multiple firms. A Cournot oligopoly is a model where participants compete with each other by controlling the amount of a homogeneous good that they produce. A market price is determined as a function of the total output of the firms. The profit of a firm is then the product of the market price and their output quantity, less any costs incurred. The producers are assumed to act strate-gically and rationally to maximize their individual profits. This model was initially studied by Cournot [1] ; for surveys of such models, see, e.g., [2] - [4] .
In this paper, we consider Cournot competition among firms who face production uncertainty. In the model we consider, firms first commit to an expected level of output; subsequently, actual production is realized, drawn from a distribution parameterized by the firm's ex ante chosen level. Any shortfall from the precommitted level incurs a penalty. Such a model captures production decisions by firms in environments where commitments must be made before all relevant factors influencing production are known.
Electricity markets serve as one motivating example of such an environment. In electricity markets, producers submit their bids before the targeted time of delivery (e.g., one day ahead). However, renewable resources, such as wind and solar, have significant uncertainty (even on a day-ahead timescale). As a result, producers face uncertainties about their actual production capacity at the commitment stage.
This paper focuses on a fundamental tradeoff revealed in such games. On one hand, in the classical Cournot model, efficiency is obtained as the number of individual firms approaches infinity, as this weakens each firm's market power (ability to influence the market price through their production choice). On the other hand, this result does not carry over when production uncertainty is present: firms protect themselves against the risk of being unable to meet the prior commitment by underproducing relative to the efficient level.
In considering how to recover efficient performance, we are naturally led to think of coalitions of firms. Informally, if firms pool together, they can mitigate individual uncertainty, any one of them may perceive in future production (a law of large numbers effect). Of course, coalitions are not without their downside: coalitions possess greater market power than individual firms. Indeed, this concern is substantial, as coalitions must be of fairly substantial size to mitigate the adverse effects of production uncertainty. In the context of electricity markets, regulators must grapple with the consequences of allowing wind generators and other renewable resources to form coalitions as they bid into the market. As a result, we are led to a fundamental question: how many coalitions should be allowed to form, and of what size, if the regulator is interesting in maximizing overall market efficiency?
We characterize this tradeoff by studying the efficiency of Cournot competition when producers are allowed to form coalitions. Our main contributions are as follows. 1) We characterize equilibrium among competing coalitions, as well as the socially optimal benchmark. 2) We compare both the welfare and production output of the firms under Cournot competition with the socially optimal welfare and output. We characterize an optimal scaling regime for coalition structure (in the limit of many firms) under which the efficiency losses can be made arbitrarily small. 3) We find the rate at which efficiency loss vanishes for when firms experience both independent and correlated uncertainties. 4) We establish an equivalence between the Cournot oligopoly and Cournot oligopsony, so our results directly apply to settings with demand uncertainty. 5) We illustrate the results in applications to electricity markets and urban parking allocation. Efficiency and welfare loss in Cournot games have been studied extensively in various contexts. Early empirical analysis of welfare loss was performed by Harberger [5] and Bergson [6] . Analytically, at the limit where many firms compete, many authors showed that a competitive limit exists [7] - [10] . The quantification of such a limit was considered by Anderson and Renault [11] where the marginal costs of the firms are assumed to be constant. The work of Johari and Tsitsikli [12] showed that for N producers with the same cost function competing for a resource with a differentiable demand curve, the efficiency loss is not more than 1/(2N + 1) when the producers are strategic and price anticipatory. The paper by Tsitsiklis and Xu [13] derived a more general bound for convex demand curves and [14] studies how the loss can be estimated in practice. The loss under asymmetric firms was studied by Corchon [15] .
Most of the preceding literature conclude that full efficiency is achieved when a large number of producers are competing against each other. In this paper, we show that this is not the case when production uncertainty plays a role in the firms' profits. Profit maximization under supply (or demand) uncertainty falls under the well studied newsvendor problem in the operations literature. However, most part of the previous work in this area is concerned with a single retailer [16] . Oligopolistic competition is studied in [17] for additive demand, and in [18] for multiplicative demand; a related model with revenue sharing between different firms is discussed in [19] . To our knowledge, none of the previous works in this area consider efficient coalition formation. Another related research in this area is contract designs (see, e.g. [20] ) where designers impose penalties to ensure that firms operate as expected. In this paper, the penalty is from uncertainties that are intrinsic to the problem.
One closely related work to ours is the work in [21] where the author studies the role of intermediaries between diversification and competition in a large economy. Its results are derived under the assumption of a common randomness affecting all consumers, whereas in ours, each producer faces its own randomness (possibly correlated with others). This latter effect is what creates efficiency gains by allowing coalitions to form.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 1) We present the basic two-stage model of Cournot competition in Section II. The market price is determined in Fig. 1 . Two-stage market model. Firms commit their production in the first stage, and this determines the price of the good. Capacities are realized in the second stage, and penalties are assessed if a firm's commitment is less than its realized capacity.
the first stage based on production commitments. In the second stage, the producer is charged a penalty if capacity is short of the firm's commitment level. We then study the same model assuming firms act in coalitions. 2) In Section III, we begin by studying the case where firms face independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) production uncertainty. We show that as the number of firms N grows, the efficiency loss does not vanish (due to the adverse effects of production uncertainty); we also show that the other extreme, a grand coalition of all producers, is inefficient (due to excessive exercise of market power). We then study coalitional competition: in particular, we characterize the optimal group size and the optimal rate at which the efficiency loss approaches zero. 3) Section V shows how the results can be applied to demand uncertainty by deriving an equivalence between the Cournot oligopoly and Cournot oligopsony (firms competing to consume a good). Section VI illustrates how the results can be applied in practice with a case study of the electricity market (based on material in [22] ). Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we define a two-stage game where multiple firms compete to satisfy the demand for a single resource. The main difference between the two-stage model and classical Cournot competition is that the bidding occurs in the first stage, but each producer has an uncertain production capacity at the time of delivery (second stage).
Suppose there are N firms. The market operates in two stages, as shown in Fig. 1 . At the first stage, firm i chooses a committed production quantity x i as its bid into the market. Let p(y) denotes the market price when y units of aggregate output are committed. Let X i denote the capacity constraint on firm i's production. Note X i is a random variable at the first stage, and is realized in the second stage. Throughout this paper, we will assume X i 's are continuous, i.e., they follow a distribution with a continuous probability density function. In this paper, we assume that the firms have full information about the distribution of the randomness at each of the firms. That is, the distribution of all X i 's is known by all of the firms. To focus on the effect of production uncertainty, we assume that each firm does not have a cost for producing the resource. 1 If the promised amount (x i ) is larger than the capacity (X i ), firm i is penalized by a cost q per unit short fall. Thus, the cost of shortfall for firm i is q(x i − X i ) + . 2 Without loss of generality, we set q = 1 for the remainder of this paper.
The assumption of a penalty linear in the shortfall is relatively common in the literature on newsvendor problems. This penalty allows us to capture the risk associated with a shortfall, i.e., promising more than what can actually be delivered; indeed, the penalty serves to make a firm risk averse in its choice of commitment level. Our main results continue to hold even for penalties of the form E[f (x i − X i ) + ], as long as f is convex, increasing, and has bounded derivative.
The structure of the penalty makes two important assumptions: first, the penalty depends only on a firm's own shortfall (i.e., no interfirm externalities); and second, any excess production capacity cannot be resold in a secondary market. In practice, these assumptions may be violated. For example, in electricity markets, a real-time market is run to balance the realized supply and demand, and the study of such markets remain an important future direction for us. Nevertheless, we believe our model captures the first-order effects of production uncertainty on firm behavior, and on the role coalitions play in achieving efficient outcomes.
We use the notation x −i to denote the quantities of chosen by all firms except i; that is,
When each firm is price anticipatory, given x −i , firm i chooses x i > 0 to maximize π i . A Nash equilibrium of the game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π N ) is a vector x ≥ 0 such that for all i
To analyze the Nash equilibrium for this game, we make the following assumptions on the price function p; this assumption remains in force for the entire paper. Assumption 1: We assume the following: 1) p is strictly decreasing and p(0) > 0; 2) p(y) is concave and differentiable on y ≥ 0 with
Since p is decreasing, p(0) > 0, and tends to −∞, there is a unique zero crossing point y max such that p(y max ) = 0.
(
These assumptions are common in the literature (e.g., see [12] ). The first assumption states that the price decreases as quantity increases and p(0) > 0 avoids trivial solutions. Concavity of the demand function is largely made for analytical 1 Our results would remain unchanged if each firm faced the same constant marginal production cost. 2 For a real number z, let z + denote the positive part of z, i.e., z + = z for z > 0, and 0 otherwise. convenience and to avoid long derivations. (See Remark 1 at the end of this section, which suggests that key results on scaling of optimal coalition size continue to hold even with weaker assumptions on demand, e.g., logconcavity.) The last assumption is also made for analytical simplicity. In practice, the price becomes zero for large enough y. This is analytically undesirable since p may not be globally concave, so in the third assumption, we allow p to be negative. This assumption is essentially without loss of generality, since the regime of interest is always restricted to aggregate production where p is nonnegative (see Proposition 1).
We make the following assumptions on the random variable X i throughout this paper.
Assumption 2: For all i, X i is a continuous random variable with finite mean.
This assumption is made mainly for analytic convenience.
It is now straightforward to show that a unique Nash equilibrium exists for the game (π 1 , . . . , π N ), as given in the following result.
Proposition 1: Suppose p satisfies Assumption 1 and X i 's satisfy Assumption 2. Then, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium x for the game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π N ). Furthermore,
The proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A. Remark 1: The concavity assumption on the inversedemand function p can be relaxed to much weaker conditions. For example, suppose that p is decreasing, continuous, and there exists a y max such that p(y max ) = 0. Note p is not necessarily concave. If all of the firms experience uncertainties with the same marginal distribution, the penalty function E[(x − X i ) + ] is identical for each firm i. By the result of [23] (or see [24, Th. 1]), there exists a symmetric equilibrium for the game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π N ).
Of course without knowing more about p, it is hard to characterize the equilibria of the game. In this paper, we investigate the case of concave p, but as a consequence of the preceding result, we expect that our main conclusions should extend to more general types of inverse demand functions, at least in the case when firms are identical.
A. System Operator
We are interested in the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium of the game (π 1 , . . . , π N ). In this section, we outline the benchmark welfare we consider; in particular, we focus on the maximum welfare achieved by a centralized system operator.
To begin, given the price function p, we define aggregate consumer surplus in the usual way as
The system operator aims to maximize aggregate consumer surplus, but incurs a cost based on the expected aggregated shortfall, assuming that it can control the output of all the producers. Note that a key difference between this paper and the existing literature is how the utility and cost are accounted for: the system operator is effectively optimizing the aggregated consumer surplus and faces an aggregated shortfall. This model is inspired by the role of the independent system operator (ISO) in electricity markets; see, e.g., [25] maximize
Note that the first term in (5a) is the not equal to the sum of the firms utilities, since in our setting the social planner is not just a grand coalition of all the firms. To see this, suppose that the inverse demand curve is given by
In addition, the reason a system operator faces the aggregate shortfall,
, is that it is always beneficial to equalize possible shortfalls in quantity by sharing resources. In the motivating example of electricity markets, suppose a system operator had control of all wind farms. Then, as long as the sum of total realized wind i X i is larger than the sum of the total committed wind i x i , there would be no additional cost.
The following lemma formalizes the benefit of aggregation to a system operator.
The proof of this lemma is a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality and is given in the extended version [26] .
Note that the objective function in (5) only depends on N i=1 x i . With a change of variables, we can rewrite (5) as
By Assumption 1, U is differentiable and concave, so the optimal solution to (7) is the unique positive solution to
Thus, we have the following corollary. 
where y max is the unique solution to (8) . Furthermore, y max ≤ y max . Therefore, at equilibrium, if the aggregate production of firms is y max , the equilibrium is socially optimal. 3 
B. Efficiency Ratio
In this section, we define two closely related efficiency ratios. The first is the usual notion based on the gap between welfares of the Nash equilibrium and the system operator's optimal outcome. This is similar to the "price of anarchy" (e.g., [27] ), but with the change that the benchmark is the system operator's payoff. The second efficiency ratio is defined as the gap between the aggregate output at the Nash equilibrium and y max . Definition 1: Consider the Cournot game (π 1 , . . . , π N ). Let (x 1 , . . . , x N ) be the Nash equilibrium of this game and let y max be the solution to (8) . The efficiency ratio r W , with respect to the welfare, is as follows:
The efficiency ratio r O , with respect to the output, is as follows:
Both efficiency ratios are of interest. The ratio of welfares measures how (in)efficient the Nash equilibrium is, and the ratio of quantities directly compares the total output under the Nash equilibrium and the aggregate social output. For example, in electricity markets, the ISO is typically interested in ensuing the maximum amount of renewable power (e.g., wind) is injected into the market. Therefore, r O the ratio of the total output under the Nash equilibrium and the maximum possible output y max can be a more direct measure of interest than r W , the ratio of welfares.
The rest of this paper investigates the behavior of r W and r O as the number of firms and the number of coalitions grow. In particular, we characterize the asymptotic scaling rate of both efficiency ratios.
C. Deterministic Cournot Games
Before moving on to the main result in Sections III and IV, we consider a deterministic version of the Cournot game, i.e., one without production uncertainty. Understanding of this deterministic game provides context for our results; furthermore, our proofs use the deterministic setting as a building block.
In the deterministic setting, we ignore the second stage of the game. Therefore, the payoff for firm i is as follows:
Compared with (1), note that the cost for shortfall is omitted.
For the rest of this paper, we use overlined variables to represent quantities in the deterministic game. Consider the game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π N ). By the same reasoning as in Proposition 1, a unique Nash equilibrium exists for this game, denoted by (x 1 , . . . , x N ). The social welfare U (y) is maximized at y max . The efficiency ratios for this game are defined as
and
The behavior of r W and r O as N increases is well understood; see, e.g., [12] . As noted in Proposition 2, r W approaches 1 and the game becomes efficient in the limit of many firms. As we show in Section III, this is no longer true if production uncertainty is present.
Proposition 2 (see Corollary 18 in [12]):
lim N →∞ r W → 1 and lim N →∞ r O → 1.
D. Coalitions
In this section, we define Cournot competition among coalitions of firms. Given N firms, let S 1 , . . . , S K be a partition of {1, . . . , N}. Let (x 1 , . . . , x N ) be a vector of production levels for each firm. The aggregate production commitment of group S k is denoted as x(S k )
Similarly, let X(S k ) = i∈S k X i denote the aggregate (random) realized capacity of the group S K . The payoff of the group S k is defined as
(15) Note that, as for the system operator, a coalition benefits by being able to use the excess production of one member to offset the shortfall of another. Thus, the penalty incurred by the coalition is the shortfall between their aggregate realized capacity and aggregate production commitment. Note that we do not consider the internal profit sharing contracts of each coalition; instead, we focus on the profit maximization of the coalition.
Given S 1 , . . . , S k , we can define a Cournot game among coalitions through the payoff functions (π 1 , . . . , π k ). In this game, the action for group S k is the aggregate production commitment x(S k ); as with profit, we do not focus on how this commitment is divided among the individual firms. The game played by coalitions is a "scaled" version of the original game played by N individual firms. The key difference is that the penalty is not linear in the firms. By an analogous result to Lemma 1
It is this reduction in risk that makes coalitions useful, as we describe in the subsequent sections.
III. INDEPENDENT FIRMS
In this section, we consider the efficiency of the two-stage Cournot game when the production uncertainty is i.i.d. across firms. Since we are interested in the large N regime, we need to specify how the random variables (X 1 , . . . , X N ) scale as N increases. Recall that X i models the realized capacity of production. Since we hold the price function constant as we increase N , we should reasonably expect that each firm will produce an infinitesimal amount in the limit. If we do not adjust the production capacity accordingly, then each firm will effectively face no production uncertainty in the large N limit.
Formally, we adjust the scale of the production capacity of each firm according to the following assumption. Under the above-mentioned assumption, the expected total capacity is fixed at μ and is divided evenly among the N firms. The technical assumption of a bounded third moment avoids random variables with very heavy tails, and is largely made for analytical convenience. The assumption μ > y max streamlines the proofs, but is not essential. We note that Assumption 3 can be equivalently formulated by holding the production capacity of each firm constant, but instead scaling the domain of the price functional. In other words, in the N th system, suppose we define the price functional to be p N (y) = p(y/N ), whereas the distribution of X for each firm remains the same.
Under Assumption 3, all firms are ex ante identical: they have the same profit and face the same production uncertainty. In this section, we consider coalitional competition where the firms are divided evenly into K groups; since we are interested in large N scenarios, we assume, without loss of generality, N is a multiple of K. The two extreme values of K are K = 1 and K = N : the former corresponds to a grand coalition, whereas the latter corresponds to competition among individual firms.
The next theorem is the main result of this section, which relates the efficiency ratios to the group size K. Theorem 1: Suppose there are N firms and X 1 , . . . , X N satisfies Assumption 3. Let (S 1 , . . . , S K ) be K groups where each group has N/K firms. Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S K )) be the solution to the game (π 1 , . . . , π K ). Then, the efficiency ratios scale as:
We focus on the discussion of the results here; the full proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix B. The last two terms in (17) and (18) can be interpreted as the effects of market power and production uncertainty, respectively. In (17) , the inefficiency due to market power scales as 1/K 2 , and it decreases as K grows. On the other hand, the inefficiency due to production uncertainty scales as K/N , which decreases as N/K (the number of members in each coalition) grows. Similarly, in (18), 1/K represents the inefficiency due to market power and K/N represents the inefficiency due to uncertainty. Note from (17) and (18) that r W and r O approach 1 as long as K and N/K both grow without bound. The following corollary gives the optimal coalition size for maximizing the rates at which they approach 1.
Corollary 2: The optimal coalition structure to maximize the right-hand side of (17) is to divide N firms into Ω(N 1/3 ) groups, each of size Ω(N 2/3 ).
The optimal coalition structure to maximize the right-hand side of (18) is to divide N firms into Ω( √ N ) groups, each of size Ω( √ N ). This Corollary follows directly from balancing the terms in Theorem 1. It is interesting to note that r W and r O are optimized by different coalition formations. However, both rates suggest that it is more efficient to have intermediate regimes of coalition sizes other than the two extremes of individual firms and the grand coalition.
The result in Theorem 1 can be extended to a more general shortfall penalty, as in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: Let f be a convex increasing function with bounded derivative, satisfying f (x) = 0 for all x ≤ 0. For a group S, let its total profit be given by
Under the same conditions as Theorem 1, the efficiency ratios still scale as
The proof of this corollary is given in Appendix C. Remark 2: The scaling rates in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 are stated as lower bounds. There are instances that demonstrate that these rates are tight. For example, let p(x) = 1 − x. In this case, the inefficiency due to market power can be calculated exactly and scales as r W = Ω(1/K 2 ) and r O = Ω(1/K). Let X i be a continuous random variable that satisfies Chebyshev's inequality with equality (see, e.g., [28] ). Then, both r W and r O scale as Ω(K/N ). (See the proof of Theorem 1 for details.)
It is worthwhile to note that the scaling rates in Theorem 1 and Corollary 3 represent the asymptotic behavior of firms. Constants of the terms in the scaling rate are determined by the particular distributions of production uncertainty, and the price function. We illustrate the behavior of the efficiency ratio at finite N with the following example. 
Example 1:
Let p(y) = 1 − y. Let X be normally distributed as N (1.1, 1). Note that y max = 1 < 1.1. Let X i be drawn i.i.d. according to the distribution of X/N . Fig. 2 plots the efficiency ratio for two groups sizes: √ N and N 2/3 . Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 show that groups of size N 2/3 is optimal for welfare efficiency and groups of size √ N is optimal for rate efficiency. Fig. 2(a) and (b) valid these claims, although there is a switch over point in Fig. 2(b) .
IV. CORRELATED FIRMS
In this section, we consider two models where firms have correlated production uncertainty.
A. Weakly Correlated Firms
The O(K/N ) terms in (17) and (18) result from the law of large numbers. The following corollary recovers the same result, using a version of the law of large numbers for correlated random variables.
Corollary 4:
Let X be a random variable satisfying Assumption 2. Let E[X] = μ > y max . Suppose there are N firms. Assume the random variables X 1 , . . . , X N each have marginal distribution that is the same as X/N . Let (S 1 , . . . , S K ) be K groups where each group has N/K firms. Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S K )) be the solution to the game (π 1 , . . . , π K ). If
for some c independent of N , then the efficiency ratios scale as in (17) and (18) . An example of correlated X i 's satisfying the abovementioned condition is where cov(X i , X j ) ≤ Aρ |i−j | , for some finite A and ρ < 1. This type of model captures a Hotellinglike geographic structure, where firms with similar indices are more likely to face the same production constraints. It is particularly relevant in electricity markets, where wind turbines located near each other exhibit this behavior. The proof of Corollary 4 is given in the extended version at [26] .
B. Strongly Correlated Firms
Earlier, we considered firms with weakly correlated production capacity, in the sense that the correlations between firms decays as the number of firms grows. In this section, we consider the case of strongly correlated production capacities, where the correlation between all firms remains positive as N grows.
When the firms have correlated capacities, results similar to Theorem 1 are difficult to obtain in general, since the limiting distribution of i X i does not necessarily concentrate; any such result will depend on the particular joint distribution of the X i 's. For this section, we assume that the correlation between random variables arises from an additive model, as described in the following assumption.
Assumption 4: Let X be a zero mean continuous random variable with symmetrical density and satisfies E[|X| 3 ] < ∞. The random variablesX 1 , . . . ,X N are drawn i.i.d. according to the same distribution as X/N . Let Z be a continuous random variable with mean μ, finite variance, and symmetrical density around its mean. The random variables Z andX 1 , . . . ,X N are independent. The random variable X i is given by
Since X i 's are strongly correlated, i X i no longer concentrates around its mean. Therefore, even for a system operator that jointly controls output of all firms, there is some residual uncertainty in the system. However, it is still beneficial to the system to share the production of all firms and then face the cost of the aggregate shortfall. With the notations used in Assumption 4, the system operators's problem is Fig. 3 . Efficiency ratio for correlated firms and i.i.d. firms as a function of the log of the number of firms. The groups size are √ N for both cases. We see that in the correlated case, the efficiency ratio increases much faster than the i.i.d. case.
As before, let y max be the unique solution to (22) and y max ≤ y max .
Theorem 2 states that the efficiency ratios between the welfares and the quantities have the same large N asymptotic behavior as in Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: LetX 1 , . . . ,X N and Z be random variables that satisfy Assumption 4. Let (S 1 , . . . , S K ) be a partition of (1, . . . , N) with size N/K each. Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S k )) be the solution to the two-stage game (π 1 , . . . , π K ). Suppose μ > y max . The efficiency ratios scale as
The proof of Theorem 2 proceeds in similar steps to the proof of Theorem 1 and can be found in the extended version at [26] .
C. Simulation Results
Here, we plot the efficiency ratio for correlated firms and compare it to independent firms. Similar to Example 1, let p(y) = 1 − y. LetX be normally distributed as N (1.1, 0.71) and let Z be normally distributed as N (0, 0.71); note that with this definition, the variance ofX + Z is 1. LetX i be drawn i.i.d. according to the same distribution asX/N . Fig. 3 shows the efficiency ratio r O for groups of size √ N on a semilog plot. As a baseline, we also plot the efficiency ratio where the random variables are drawn i.i.d. with normal distribution N (1.1, 1) .
From Fig. 3 , we can see that the efficiency ratio r O approaches 1 much faster if the firms are correlated. This is not unexpected, since production uncertainty is dominated by the common random variable Z, and the individual randomness can be averaged out more easily.
V. COURNOT OLIGOPSONY
There is a natural Cournot oligopsony game corresponding to the Cournot oligopoly game discussed in previous sections. Instead of suppliers of a common good, firms can be thought as consumers of a common good. If there are uncertainties in the demands of the firms, a natural question arises: does coalition increase the efficiency of Cournot oligopsony as in the case of Cournot oligopoly?
We answer this question by showing that under certain demand side models, all results from previous sections can be directly applied through an equivalency between the Cournot oligopoly and Cournot oligopsony. Before the technical details, let us consider the following motivating example of parking in business districts.
Example 2: Many cities around the world are experiencing increasing vehicle traffic in downtown and business areas. Currently, most cities allocate a fixed number of parking spaces to a firm. 4 For firm i, suppose it is allocated x i number of parking spaces. The amount of vehicles (demand of the firm) that visit the firm is a random variable denoted by X i . If a vehicle successfully finds parking, the firm derives a certain amount of utility. If parking is not available when users try to visit a firm, it gets no utility. Therefore, firm i's utility is proportional to min(x i , X i ).
An increase of parking spaces is correlated with the total traffic into downtown areas. This increase in traffic could potentially increase congestion and, therefore, parking is tightly controlled by the city. We model this cost with a price function p( x i ) and firm i has cost x ip ( x i ).
With the above-described motivation, we define the expected payoff for firm i to be
Each firm is price anticipatory and firm i chooses x i > 0 to maximize T i for a given x −i . A Nash equilibrium for this game is defined to be the same as in (2) . As the analogous of Assumption 1, we make the following assumption on the pricep. Assumption 5: We assume the following: 1)p is strictly increasing and 0 <p(0) < 1; 2)p(y) is convex and differentiable on y ≥ 0 withp (0 + ) > 0; 3)p(y) → ∞ as y → ∞. Thep(0) < 1 assumption is made to avoid trivial solutions, since ifp(0) > 1 no firm will choose a positive bid. Note, we assume that the utility and the price function, E[min(x i , X i )] andp, have been appropriately scaled to have the same units.
It is straightforward to show that a Nash equilibrium exists for the game (T 1 , . . . , T N ) as given in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Supposep satisfies Assumption 5 and X i 's satisfy Assumption 2. Then, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium x for the game defined by (T 1 , . . . , T N ) .
The proof of this proposition is given in the extended version at [26] . 4 Excluding private parking garages.
A. Social Welfare and Efficiency
Given the price functionp, we define the aggregate cost as
Similar to the oligopoly case, a system operator with control of all the firms would always aggregate the supply and demand as shown by Lemma 2. Lemma 2 : Suppose x 1 , . . . , x N are a set of real numbers and X 1 , . . . , X N are a set real random variables each satisfying Assumption 2. Then
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix B. Therefore, from a system operator's point of view, the optimal allocation is characterized by solving the following problem:
The objective function in (28) only depends on the sum of allocations, so we can write it as
subject to y ≥ 0.
Letŷ max be the solution to (29) . As in Definition 1, we define the two efficiency ratios, one based on the welfares and one based on the quantities. Definition 2: Consider the Cournot game (T 1 , . . . , T N ). Let (x 1 , . . . , x N ) be the Nash equilibrium of this game. The efficiency ratio r W , with respect to the welfares, is as follows:
The efficiency ratio r O , with respect to the quantities, is as follows:
As in Sections III and IV, we are interested in the behaviors of r W and r O as N grows. The next section shows that there is an exact equivalence between the game (T 1 , . . . , T N ) studied in this section and the game (π 1 , . . . , π N ) studied in Sections III and IV. Consequently, the main results in Theorems 1 and 2 carry over directly.
B. Equivalence Between Oligopoly and Oligopsony
A certain level of symmetry between oligopoly and oligopsony is commonly expected in Cournot games, but the key difficulty is to ensure that efficient allocations and Nash equilibria remain unchanged between the two models. The following theorem is the main result of this section. 
Define an associated utility function U (y) = y 0 p(z)dz. Then, the following statements hold.
1) Assumption 1 is satisfied by p.
2) For any vector x ≥ 0, the following holds:
as well as
3) A vector x solves the system operator's problem in (5) if and only if it solves the system operator's problem in (28) . 4) A vector x is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by (T 1 , . . . , T N ) if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π N ). The proof of this theorem is given in [26] .
VI. CASE STUDY OF WIND INTEGRATION IN POWER SYSTEMS
This section applies the result of this paper to electricity markets. This material is based on [22] . We focus on the PJM control area, where a dramatic increase of wind generation has been seen. Among other effects, the one most pertinent to this paper is a significant drop in energy prices as wind penetration grows. Fig. 4 (reproduced from [29] ) shows that the day-ahead electricity price can drop by as much as 50% with just 10% of wind penetration.
The electricity market in PJM and most other regions of the United States operate with a two-stage structure. The first stage occurs roughly 24 hours before the actual time of delivery of electricity where generators compete to satisfy the forecasted demand. The second stage is called the real-time stage since it adjusts the supply and demand to meet any potential imbalances. Since most conventional generators needs at least several hours to change production levels, most of the market is cleared at the day-ahead stage. From PJM market reports (see [30] ), it seems that conventional generators already bid their true cost in the current market, and therefore would not change their bid when wind power producers enter the market (bidding lower makes Figure reproduced from [29] . The horizontal axis is the percentage penetration of wind, and the vertical axis is the average clearing price in the PJM area. As the amount of wind penetration increases from 0% to 10%, the average price in the system drops by more than half. no economic sense and bidding higher decreases the chance that they are cleared). However, investigating the joint action between renewable and conventional generators is an important area of future research.
We think of wind power producers as the firms competing in the day-ahead market. Each firm faces uncertain supply, since its output is determined by the wind conditions in the future; in addition, each firm can impact the price as shown in Fig. 4 . Therefore, the Cournot game developed in this paper can be used to model their behavior.
For an empirical study, we use wind data produced by NREL for Eastern United States [31] . Both wind forecast value and forecast error are included in the dataset. We interpret the forecast value as the mean of the random supply and the error as the variation in the supply. There are 302 wind farm locations that are in the PJM control area. Fig. 5 shows the normalized standard deviation of the aggregate forecast as a function of the number of wind farms in the aggregate. Strong correlations can be observed between these forecasts.
Applying the analysis in Section IV, Fig. 6 shows the optimal coalitions of the wind farms. Note the social optimal solution is taken to be the solution that maximizes the amount of wind injected into the market. Interested readers can find a much more detailed analysis in [22] . 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the strategic behavior of firms and coalitions in a Cournot game with production uncertainty. We study the efficiency of Cournot competition by characterizing a fundamental tradeoff: on one hand, market power increases as coalition size grows; on the other hand, the cost of production uncertainty is mitigated as coalition size grows. We show there is a "sweet spot," in the sense that there exist groups that are large enough to achieve the uncertainty reduction, but small enough such that they have no significant market power.
These results have important implications for regulators in industries with production uncertainty, such as electricity markets. In particular, our results suggest that within some limits, coalition formation among, e.g., generators of renewables may actually increase overall welfare. We have validated these results in electricity markets in [22] , where we empirically study the welfare benefits of coalitions of (a finite number of) wind power generators.
We conclude by noting two important open directions. First, as previously noted, in many real markets (including electricity markets), a firm may face a "spot" or secondary market, into which it can sell excess capacity, or from which it must buy additional capacity to cover a shortfall. Modeling this two-stage market game remains an important challenge. Second, all our results are asymptotic, though we do characterize the rate of convergence to efficiency with optimal coalition sizes. With finitely many (potentially heterogeneous) firms, the regulator faces the potentially challenging problem of computing optimal coalitions.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proof: We first observe that the strategy space of each firm can be restricted to a compact set, without loss of generality. For any vector x −i chosen by the other firms, if Pr(X i < y max ) > 0, then firm i is always strictly better off by choosing 0 than choosing a quantity larger than y max . If Pr(X i < y max ) = 0 and k =i x k > 0, again firm i is always strictly better off by choosing 0 than choosing a production larger than y max . If
Pr(X i < y max ) = 0 and k =i x k = 0, then firm i's best strategy is to maximize x i p(x i ). By Assumption 1, the unique maximizer of x i p(x i ) is strictly larger than 0 and strictly smaller than y max . Thus, we may restrict the strategy space of a firm to [0, y max ].
Since p satisfies Assumption 1, p( i x i )x i is concave. By Assumption 2, E[(x i − X i ) + ] exists and −E[(x i − X i ) + ] is concave in x i . By additivity of concave functions, π i is concave for all x i ≥ 0.
The game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π N ) with strategy spaces ([0, y max ], . . . , [0, y max ]) is now a strictly concave game: each payoff π i is continuous and strictly concave in x and the strategy space of firm i is a nonempty compact set. By Rosen's existence theorem (see [32] ), there is a unique Nash equilibrium for this game.
Furthermore, suppose x i > y max . Then, at least one of the x i s is positive. But then, firm i is strictly better off if it reduces x i . Therefore, at equilibrium, x i ≤ y max .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: We fill first assume (18) holds and use it to prove (17) . Then, we prove (18) to be true.
First, we observe that all groups are symmetric, therefore, each of them has the same expected cost
For notational convenience, let x K = Kx(S k ) and X K = KX(S k ). Note that E[X K ] = μ. LetX K = X K − μ be the zero mean version. Similarly, we can write N i X i = μ +X, whereX is zero mean. Using these notations, the efficiency ratio r W is
The following proposition is useful for bounding r W . 
The proof of Proposition 4 is by straightforward calculations and can be found in [26] . Applying it, we have
where X is independent ofX K and the expectation is now taken with respect to bothX andX K . Therefore, to lower bound r W , it suffices to lower bound
(38)
Inserting an independent copy ofX into the expectation allows us to analyze (38) using a Taylor expansion.
where we neglect the higher order terms in the Taylor expansion.
To obtain a Taylor expansion of E[(x K − μ −X −X K ) + ] around y max , we use conditional expectation by successively conditioning onX K andX
where again the higher order terms are neglected and (a) follows from E[X K ] = 0 and the independence betweenX andX K . Substituting (39) and (40) into (38) yields
g (y max ) = δ(U (y max )−g (y max )) + δ 2 2 (g (y max ) − U (y max ))
where (a) follows from first-order optimality conditions and fact that y max maximizes U (y) − g(y). We now derive more explicit formulas for the constants in (41)
wheref is the pdf ofX; and U (y max ) = p (y max ).
By Assumption 2,f exists; by Assumption 1, p (y max ) is negative. Therefore, both g (y max ) and −U (y max ) are positive constants.
The deviation δ 2 can be calculated from (18) . By (18) , δ scales as O( 1 K ) + O( K N ) and δ 2 scales as
SinceX K is zero mean
Combining the above-discussed arguments, we have
By Proposition 4, E[(y − μ −X −X K ) + ] ≥ E[(y − μ − X K ) + ] and we have the efficiency ratio scales as
We now prove (18) . The strategy of the proof proceeds in two steps. First, we consider a deterministic game with K players, and bound the difference between the Nash equilibrium of the game (π 1 , . . . , π K ) and the Nash equilibrium of the deterministic game. Then, we bound the difference between the latter and y max .
Let (S 1 , . . . , S K ) be an equal-sized partition of (1, . . . , N), with each coalition of size N/K. Consider a deterministic game defined by (π 1 , . . . , π K ) where π k = p K m =1
x(S m ) x(S k ).
Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S K )) be a Nash equilibrium of this game. By symmetry, x(S k ) are of the same value. We denote this value by x K ; it satisfies p(Kx K ) + p (Kx K )x K = 0.
Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S K )) be a Nash equilibrium of the game (π 1 , . . . , π K ). Again, this equilibrium is symmetric. Denote the common production level of each coalition by x K . Similarly, denote X(S k ) by X K . Since E[(x K − X K ) + ] is increasing in x K , we have x K ≤ x K . Therefore, we can rewrite x K as x K − Δ, for some Δ ≥ 0 that solves
Subtracting (44) from (45), we have
Since p is concave and decreasing, p (Kx K ) < p (Kx K − KΔ) < 0. Also, since x K is positive, the term in the second set of brackets p (Kx K − KΔ)(x K − Δ) − p (Kx K )x K is greater than or equal to zero. To see this, it is easier to rewrite the term as −p (Kx K )x K − (−p (Kx K − KΔ)(x K − Δ)). Because p is differentiable and decreasing, and Δ is positive, −p (Kx K ) is positive and greater than −p (Kx K − KΔ). Since x K ≥ x K − Δ, as long as x K is positive, −p (Kx K )x K − (−p (Kx K − KΔ)(x K − Δ)) ≥ 0. Also, since Δ is positive, Pr(X K ≤ x K − Δ) ≤ Pr(X k ≤ x K ). Therefore where ( * ) follows from the fact that p is negative and decreasing (p is decreasing and concave). Since p is concave and decreasing, and p(y max ) = 0
See Fig. 7 for an illustration of (52). Combining (51) . Therefore, δ = O(1/K).
Combining the two parts of the proof
Dividing both sides by y max gives the desired result
APPENDIX C PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
Proof: Let (S 1 , . . . , S K ) be an equal-sized partition of (1, . . . , N) (each of size N/K). Consider the deterministic game (π 1 , . . . , π K ) played by the groups. Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S K )) be a Nash equilibrium of this game. Let (x(S 1 ), . . . , x(S K )) be a Nash equilibrium of the game (π 1 , . . . , π K ). Since E[f (x K − X K )] is increasing in x(S k ), x K ≤ x K , we can rewrite x K as x K − Δ with Δ ≥ 0. Following the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain
Since f is bounded, E[f (x K − X k )] ≤ B Pr(x K − X K ≥ 0) for some B. Therefore, Δ scales as O(K/N ). Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1, the efficiency ratio
An analogous proposition to Proposition 4 can be derived for a convex and increasing f , and a similar Taylor expansion argument can be used to bound r W based on r O .
